Many theoretical constructs of interest to psychologists are multidimensional and derive from the integration of several input variables. We show that input variables that are measured on ordinal scales cannot be combined to produce a stable weakly ordered output variable that allows trading off the input variables. Instead a partial order is obtained in which the amount of ordering depends on the number and nature of the input variables and the relationship between them. However, if trade-offs are excluded, it is still possible to obtain a weak order using lexicographic ordering of the input variables. An implication is that psychological processes that integrate information from different input variables and that produce consistent output require that the input variables be measured on more than ordinal scales. A further implication is that the level of measurement of the input variables affects the kind of psychological model that can be applied to the process.
Many theoretical accounts of psychological processes assume that organisms integrate and trade off information from input variables. Although researchers and methodologists have paid a good deal of attention to the scale of measurement of the output variables from such processes, rather less attention has been paid to the input variables and, in particular, how the measurement scale of the input variables may affect the output of psychological processes. This article considers the implications of having input variables that are assumed to be measured on ordinal rather than interval or ratio scales.
One of the most influential articles in psychology was published by S. S. Stevens in Science in 1946 on scales of measurement. Stevens elaborated on earlier work (e.g., Hölder, 1901) about how quantities in the real world can be measured and went on to identify the four scale types-nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio-that have been widely familiar to psychologists ever since. One of the most important implications of Stevens's article is that, when arithmetic operations are performed on psychological variables, whether or not valid inferences can be drawn depends on the scale type involved.
An ordinal scale is one in which it is possible to order items on some attribute, and to make such statements as "a is greater than b" (i.e., a has more of the attribute than b), but it is not possible to say how much greater a is than b. However, if items are measured on an interval scale, it is meaningful also to compute the difference between a and b and compare this, for example, with the difference between b and c. Ratio scales permit meaningful judgments such as "Weight a is twice as heavy as weight b" to be made. In keeping with Stevens's (1946 Stevens's ( , 1955 recommendation, it is usual to define the scale types in terms of the admissible transformations that can be performed on them. Values on an ordinal scale can be transformed by any monotonically increasing function; values on an interval scale by linear functions of the form ax ϩ b; and values on a ratio scale by multiplication by a constant, ax.
Within psychology, the methodological research that has built on Stevens (1946) has followed at least two paths. One path, known as representational measurement theory, has progressed in the tradition of Hölder (1901) to investigate what it means to measure any quantity (e.g., Krantz, Luce, Suppes, & Tversky, 1971; Luce, 1996; Narens, 2002; Roberts, 1979; Schwager, 1991; Scott & Suppes, 1958) .
Another path has focused on the implications of the distinction between ordinal and interval measures for using parametric statistical techniques such as t tests, analysis of variance, and multiple regression. The critical issue, noted by Stevens (1955) , is that if one's measure only satisfies the assumptions of ordinality, it is possible to get different statistical results by changing the numbers but still maintaining the order of the different elements. For example, if there are two sets, each containing two weights, and we know only that the heaviest and lightest are in Set A and the middle two are in Set B, the mean weight of Set A could be higher or lower than that of Set B depending on the exact values of the weights.
In the real world of weight measurement, the difficulty does not arise because the four actual weights are measured on a ratio scale and the numerical values cannot be as freely transformed as they are on an ordinal scale. But for psychology, the measurement status of variables such as ratings of happiness or facial attractiveness has never been so clear. Debate over the nature of psychological measurement and the implications for statistical analysis has been virtually continual, and there is a considerable body of specialist writing on the issue (e.g., Cliff, 1992 Cliff, , 1993a Cliff, , 1993b Davison & Sharma, 1988; Gardner, 1975; Hand, 1996; Lord, 1953; Maxwell & Delaney, 1985; Michell, 1997 Michell, , 1999 . Texts on research methods sometimes summarize this debate by suggesting that if one adopts strict criteria, psychological measures often attain only ordinal status but that little practical damage is done by treating them as if they were interval scales (see, e.g., Coolican, 1990, p. 133; Kerlinger & Lee, 1992, pp. 635-638; Shaughnessy, Zechmeister, & Zechmeister, 2006, p. 24) . Whether such practice is justified remains an open question and one with important implications for psychology as a scientific discipline.
This article is mainly concerned with how having input variables that are measured on ordinal scales affects the output of psychological processes. As Michell (1999) noted, such output is expected to be less structured than that obtained when the variables input to psychological processes are interval scales. Arrow's (1950) demonstration of the difficulty of obtaining overall welfare functions from different ranked preferences also suggests that obtaining well-ordered outputs is problematic.
In the next two brief sections, we introduce conjoint measurement and four types of ordinal measure, respectively. Then we move on to consider the simple case in which an output variable is formed by adding two input variables, in which one increases as the other decreases. We find that if one of the input variables is measured as an ordinal (but not as an interval) scale, the output variable cannot be consistently ordered. Following this demonstration, we show that the inconsistency in output variable ordering generally increases with the number of ordinal-level input variables and as the correlation between the variables decreases.
We then consider some input variables that have been proposed for different psychological processes and how their scale status affects the output variables that are obtained. For the most part, we concentrate on processes of individual decision making and the construction of psychological scales. Generally, if the modeling of the processes allows trade-offs and if the input variables are only ordinal scales, the output is either inconsistent or only partially ordered. This leads to consideration of whether psychological processes have to allow trade-offs and whether there are viable alternative models that do not permit trade-offs. We turn next to investigating the question of how different types of input variables might be incorporated in various models of psychological processes that might be employed. The penultimate section then reverses the argument: If we obtain reasonably stable, ordered output from psychological processes that permit trading off, can we infer that the input variables are not ordinal? Finally, we summarize and note general consequences for psychological models.
Multidimensionality and Conjoint Measures
Much existing work that has considered the nature of psychological measurement has focused on variables or constructs that are viewed, implicitly or explicitly, as unidimensional. However, many real-world decisions and many, if not most, psychological measures and judgments are derived by combining or aggregating information of different kinds (cf. Massaro & Friedman, 1990) . So, for example, a consumer shopping for a new washing machine might consider the quality, features, and cost of different models in making a decision. A panel that is seeking to award graduate research fellowships on the basis of overall excellence might consider the candidates' previous academic record, performance on standardized examinations, and plans for graduate study, as well as referees ' comments (McCauley, 1991) .
Research in measurement theory has addressed the issue of multidimensional constructs, typically described as conjoint measurement or conjoint analysis (e.g., Luce & Tukey, 1964; Roberts, 1979; Schwager, 1991) . So, for example, the judged comfort of an environment might depend conjointly on the humidity and temperature (Krantz et al., 1971, p. 245) . A good deal of theoretical work has focused on identifying assumptions about the input variables that enable an ordering of the output variable (e.g., Holman, 1971; Luce & Tukey, 1964; Narens, 1974; Roberts, 1979; Wakker, 1989) . However, there has also been a wide range of application, including choice and decision making (e.g., Roberts, 1979, Chapter 5; Wakker, 1989) , psychophysics, and motivational theory (e.g., Krantz et al., 1971, pp. 268 -270; Luce, 2002) . Little work has dealt directly with the case in which one or more of the input variables is ordinal, although one of the key axioms for additive conjoint measurement, the cancellation axiom, need not hold if one of the input variables is not interval scaled. (An example of failure of the cancellation axiom when interval scale assumptions are relaxed is given in Appendix A. For wider discussion of necessary and sufficient axioms for conjoint measurement, see Luce & Tukey, 1964; Narens, 1974; Wakker, 1989.) The primary goal of measurement theory has been to establish conditions for the more precise types of measurement: ratio and interval scales. This focus seems entirely appropriate, given that these scales allow more precise and interesting relationships between variables to be discovered (for a review, see Narens, 2002) . Nonetheless, as it is often questioned whether psychological measures attain the status of interval scales, there is still scope for examining the conditions under which ordinal scaling is possible. In the remainder of this article, we concentrate particularly on whether ordinal scaling is possible if the input variables to conjoint analysis are ordinal.
Types of Orders
The analysis that follows focuses on ordinal scales. But as will become clear, the term ordinal scale is not precise enough for our purposes. Thus, some order relations and properties need to be defined and distinguished, and we provide a summary of some major concepts here. Generally, consider some elements a, b, c . . . that form part of a set and a relation R defined on them. aRb means "a stands in relation to b." A relation is said to be transitive if when aRb and bRc, then aRc. So, for example, if we take R as being "greater than" (Ͼ) and a, b, and c as ordinary numbers, then for transitivity a Ͼ b and b Ͼ c imply a Ͼ c. A relation is complete if, for all a and b in the set, either aRb or bRa. For example, for the greaterthan relation, it may be that we can order all the elements so that either a Ͼ b or b Ͼ a. Some relations allow that both aRb and bRa can be true. Obviously this is not true of numbers for the greater-than relation, but it could be true of "greater than or equal to." A relation is said to be antisymmetric if when both aRb and bRa, then a ϭ b. (This is true for ordinary numbers and the greater-than-orequal-to relation.)
We consider four types of ordering. First, when the relation is transitive, complete, and antisymmetric, we have a total (sometimes called simple) order (e.g., Narens, 2002; Roberts, 1979) . In this case, all the elements can be unambiguously ordered with no ties. For example, places in a race form a total ordering, provided all the photo finishes can be resolved.
Second, we may have a weak order, which has a relation that is transitive and complete. The relation is often taken as greater than or equal to (Ն). (A related concept that sometimes has the meaning "is preferred to or someone is indifferent between" is written ՝ ϳ .) A weak order allows ties. A simple example would be student grades, where a number of students might obtain a grade of B. The relation is not antisymmetric, because we cannot presume that two students with a B are the same student. Most conjoint analysis has been concerned with output variables that are weakly ordered.
Third, a partial order is transitive and antisymmetric but not complete (e.g., Roberts, 1979 , Chapter 1). Basically, this means that we can order only some of the elements in the set. So, for example, we could find that some respondents have not completed a survey question and their responses on that question cannot be ordered. An obvious question to ask about a partial order is, How many of the pairs of elements can be weakly ordered?
Fourth, there is lexicographic ordering. This kind of ordering is common in telephone directories, where names are ordered according to the first letter of the surname, second letter, and so on. Lexicographic ordering does not have to be on letters of the alphabet; the key feature is that it is done on different dimensions sequentially. Lexicographic ordering is inherently conjoint, as the elements are all ordered first on one dimension (e.g., the first letter of the surname), and then ties are resolved on another. It is easy to see that lexicographic ordering results in at least a weak order, and often a total order, and so is better regarded as a way of achieving ordering without trade-offs than a different type of ordering. A formal definition is given in Krantz et al. (1971, p. 38) . Lexicographic orderings are conveniently described as decision trees. For example, in selecting candidates for a graduate fellowship, one might begin by restricting the possibilities only to candidates whose graduate plans are plausible, then by rejecting candidates whose referees are unenthusiastic, and then by requiring that all the remaining candidates have a standardized examination score that is higher than some cutoff.
Ordinal Conjoint Analysis
This section shows that, in an additive conjoint analysis in which one of two input variables is a total ordering, the ordering of the output variable varies markedly with permissible transformations of the ordered input variable. More formally, we consider a single formative output variable, z, defined by conjoining two input variables, x and y, for each of N distinct elements. So, for example, z could be preference scores among three candidates for a graduate fellowship that depend only on a standardized examination result (x) and the quality of an essay that describes their plans for study (y), as shown in Figure 1 . We will accept that x is measured on at least an interval scale, and y is totally ordered but not an interval scale, so that for all elements i and j, either y i Ͼ y j or y i Ͻ y j . (Note that if x is considered to be only a total ordering, the same consequences follow but rather more readily.)
We consider only the simplest additive case in which z is defined by ax ϩ y (z i ϭ ax i ϩ y i , for all i), and we are concerned mainly with whether the ordering of the elements of z can be changed under permissible transformations of x and y. Concentration on the simple additive case (as is common, although not universal, in conjoint analysis) is not as restrictive as it might appear. For example, a can be negative, thus allowing a subtractive model, as might happen in a cost-benefit analysis, for example; because we are interested only in the ordering of z, adding a constant b (z i ϭ ax i ϩ y i ϩ b) makes no difference and nor does a monotonic transformation of (ax ϩ y); the multiplicative model z ϭ bx a y can be dealt with by taking logarithms. (See also Appendix B.)
The additive model presumes that trade-offs are possible. For example, if x i Ͼ x j (and both are positive), it does not necessarily follow that z i Ͼ z j , as it may be that y j /a Ͼ y i /a. The additive model may be contrasted with the principle of lexicographic ordering discussed in the previous section. The fundamental issue is illustrated in Figure 1 , which presents a simple case in which a ϭ 1. (In practice, the value of a will depend on the ranges of x and y as well as their importance.) Suppose we form a fellowship preference variable by adding our estimate of the value of the plan to the examination score. Consider the examination score (x) of B to be eight units and that of C to be 10 units. If the value of the graduate plan (y) of B is six units and C is three units, then we would prefer to award our fellowship to B (8 ϩ 6 ϭ 14) rather than C (10 ϩ 3 ϭ 13). But if y is an ordinal 2 We do not say here that it is always possible to find a y j , such that for a given y i , and x i Ͼ x j , then z i Ͻ z j (the Archimedean axiom; see, e.g., . scale, then any order-preserving transformation is permissible. For example, we could reduce the difference between the plan scores by assigning a score of five units for C. This preserves the ordering of the plans but changes the overall scores such that C is now preferred to B.
Two points should be noted. First, not all the fellowship award preference orders are changed. In particular, both B and C are preferred to A under any monotonic transformation of plan quality (or any monotonic transformation of examination score for that matter). This is because B has both better plan quality and a better examination score. If B is preferred to A on every relevant dimension, then B is said to dominate A.
Second, in this simple case in which there are only three candidates (elements), we could obtain a preference reversal between B and C by a permissible interval scale transformation: We could multiply the plan quality numbers by a sufficiently large constant to outweigh the effect of inferior examination score. However, such a transformation once done must be applied to the plan qualities of all the candidates, A (and D and E) as well as B and C.
By contrast, if we exclude all the relationships in which one element dominates another, it turns out that the ordering of z is completely malleable if y can be subjected to any order-preserving transformation. More formally, let z i ϭ x i ϩ y i . x and y are strictly ordered so that for all i Ͼ j, x i Ͼ x j and y i Ͻ y j . Suppose m Ͼ n and z m Ͻ z n . Then it is possible to find a transformation of y (to yЈ) that preserves the strict ordering of y and in which z m Ј Ͼ z n Ј but in which all orderings of zЈ that do not involve z m Ј are the same as those of z. A formal constructive proof of this proposition under reasonably general conditions is given in Appendix B.
Thus, the order of any two selected elements in the output variable can be interchanged, while leaving the order of both input variables and that of the other elements of the output variable unchanged. The process can be applied repeatedly. As a result, any final ordering of the output variable becomes possible. The implication is that when at least one of the input variables is ordinal, it is not possible to establish unambiguous trade-offs, because permissible transformations of the ordinal-level input variable lead to contradictory results. On the other hand, note that ordering pairs of elements on an output variable does not always involve trade-offs, because one element may dominate another.
The ordering of z (or the overall suitability of the candidates in the example of Figure 1 ) does not satisfy the requirements of a weak order, as either transitivity or completeness is violated. Which of these requirements is violated depends on how we choose to define the cases in which z i could be either less than or greater than z j depending on the permissible transformations of y. We could define them as z i ϳ z j . But if we do this, then transitivity is violated (as it is for the candidates in Figure 1 , e.g.). Alternatively, one can simply leave such cases out. However, then the ordering is not complete, and we have a partial order. In the next section we consider two issues that affect the degree of ordering that can be attained.
Relatedness and Number of Input Variables
As we have just seen, under an additive model with two input variables, one element may dominate another. However, where there is no dominance, and where at least one input variable is measured only as a total ordering, there is no consistent ordering of the output variable. An important question then becomes, How frequently does dominance occur?
Note, first, that if A dominates B and C dominates D, there do not have to be dominance relationships between A, on the one hand, and C and D, on the other. In other words, it is not possible simply to divide up all the elements into those that can be ordered and those that cannot. Ordering depends on the particular pairs chosen for comparison (see also Roberts, 1979 , Chapter 1).
The incidence of dominance depends on the relationship between the two input variables, and a general equation predicting the probability of dominance from conditional probabilities (e.g., the probability that candidate i has a better quality plan than candidate j, given that i also has a better examination score than j) is given in Appendix C, where outcomes for three special cases are worked out. First, if there is perfect positive correlation (Spearman ϭ 1) between the two input variables, then there is dominance in every pair. For example, if the candidate with the best plan also had the best examination score, the candidate with the next best plan had the next best examination score, and so on, an unambiguous preference ordering of candidate suitability can easily be obtained if plan quality and examination score are measurable only as total orders. At the other extreme there could be a perfect negative correlation ( ϭ Ϫ1) between the two input variables, and as shown in the previous section, no pair of elements can be unambiguously ordered. As an intermediate case, if the two input variables are independent, a dominance relationship in half the pairs is expected. For the fellowship selection example, one would probably expect a positive correlation. However, if one were to consider a preference ordering of consumer goods that vary on quality and cost, such as washing machines, one would generally expect a negative correlation, as better quality products are often more expensive. (Note, incidentally, that simply reversing the order of one of the input variables does not affect the issue, because reversing the order also causes the relationship of this input variable with the output variable to reverse. For example, if we substitute cheapness for cost of the products, then we also reverse its effect on the overall preference.)
To examine the relationship between the correlation of the input variables and the incidence of dominance more systematically, we conducted a Monte Carlo study. This analysis assumed that there was a set of 10 elements (e.g., candidates for a fellowship), which varied on two attributes (e.g., plan quality and examination score). Pairs of attributes were determined for each element by sampling two independent random variables, each distributed uniformly from 0 to 1 and with a specified correlation. For each iteration we sampled the attributes for each element and then computed the percentage of the pairs (N ϭ 45) that were nondominant. Correlations ranged from Ϫ1.0 to 1.0 in steps of 0.1, and 10,000 iterations were performed for each correlation. Results in Figure 2 show that the percentage of nondominated pairs-that is, those pairs for which if one candidate had a better quality plan, the other had a better examination score, or vice versa-was 100% when the attributes were perfectly negatively correlated and decreased monotonically as the correlation increased. The percentage of nondominated pairs was 50% and 0% for correlations of 0 and Ϫ1.0, respectively, consistent with the analysis in Appendix C.
The number of input variables is also important. So far we have considered only two, but evaluations are often based on three or more variables. For example, in the selection of National Science Foundation Graduate Fellows, panels have been asked to consider not only Graduate Record Examination scores and the applicants' essays on plans for graduate studies, but also three or four reference letters and the students' undergraduate grade point averages (McCauley, 1991) . The effect of additional ordered (but not interval scaled) input variables is to reduce the proportion of element pairs that can be unambiguously ordered on the output variable. As we have just seen, if we start with two input variables of which at least one is ordinal, then, except for the special case in which these exhibit perfect positive rank order correlation, some pairs of elements produce no dominance relationship and are thus unordered. Such pairs remain unordered no matter how many more input variables are considered. On the other hand, pairs that have a dominance relationship with two input variables may lose it when an additional variable is considered. For example, candidate B may have a higher quality plan and a better examination score than candidate A but less favorable references.
As a simple example, suppose we initially base our evaluation of a large number of elements on two independent variables with total ordering on each. Half the element pairs are then ordered on the output variable. The addition of a third variable that is independent of the other two (and of the original output variable) leaves half the previously ordered pairs ordered and half unordered. The previously unordered pairs remain unordered. Thus, adding the extra variable reduces the expected proportion of ordered pairs from .50 to .25.
So far we have omitted discussion of measurement error. Consideration of dominance and nondominance is itself consideration of an important source of error, as nondominant pairs are simply removed from ordering and errors associated with normal trade-off judgments (e.g., multiplying by weights and adding up) do not arise. Of course, other sources of error remain. For example, a panel member may have an idiosyncratic bias against a candidate's plan for future study, or mistakenly believe it is not practical when it really is. There might be transcription errors in some of the examination results. If the errors are independent on the different dimensions (e.g., the chance of mistakenly believing that A's plan is impractical is independent of examination transcription error), one would expect the measured rank order correlations to move closer to zero and the proportion of dominated pairs to move closer to (0.5) n where n is the number of dimensions. Overall, however, one would not expect much influence of error in considerations of dominance and nondominance.
To summarize, we have shown that when one of two input variables is measured as a total order, trade-offs between this variable and the other produce inconsistent orderings of the output variable. This inconsistency does not occur when one element in a pair dominates the other on all input variables. However, the occurrence of dominance among element pairs decreases as the correlation between the input variables decreases and as the number of input variables is increased. Except when there are few, positively correlated input variables, the percentage of element pairs that display dominance and thus can be consistently ordered is likely to be small.
Nature of the Input Variables
We begin exploring the implications of our analysis for psychological methodology by reviewing examples from a variety of different contexts. These lead us to consider several types of input variables and the important case in which the same variable is an output from one stage of a psychological process and an input to another.
Models that allow for trade-offs between different input dimensions are widely used in psychology. For example, additive multiattribute models that incorporate trade-off possibilities are common in theories of both how people make judgments and how decision making can be improved (e.g., Edwards, 1977; Fandel & Spronk, 1985; Zeleny, 1982) . The idea that the suitability of candidates for a fellowship is based on their plans for the future and their past performance is a simple example of such a model, and McCauley's (1991) analysis of National Science Foundation Graduate Fellow selection found that average panel ratings were very similar to the selections that would have been made from simply taking a weighted average of the variables considered. Other examples are common in applied psychology, such as personnel selection, in which applicants are evaluated on a variety of skills, abilities, and experience (Hough & Oswald, 2000) . Ratings of both teaching and research ability (not to mention collegiality or willingness to take on administrative tasks) might be taken into account when new faculty are hired.
Cost-benefit decisions also explicitly allow for trade-offs. Governments faced with a choice of different policies might attempt to arrive at a preference order by considering both the benefits to be obtained from the policies and their costs. (For the psychology of such decisions, see Kemp, 2002.) Note that here, as for many multiattribute judgments, the decision might be made either by a group or by an individual (Keeney, 1977) . Judgments that sum up over different dimensions are also obtained in apparently simple perceptual processes. So, for example, the loudness of a sound depends not only on its physical intensity but also on its frequency, duration, and temporal patterning and whether it is heard in one ear or two (e.g., Zwicker & Feldtkeller, 1967) .
Examination of the input variables involved in these cases reveals that some of them (e.g., the physical intensity, frequency, or duration of a sound or the cost of a government policy) are clearly specified as interval or ratio scales that can be measured as such by an experimenter or other outside observer. Where all the input variables can be specified in this way, it is possible to obtain well-ordered output variables (for more detail, see, e.g., Wakker, 1989) . By contrast, other input variables (e.g., the perceived quality of a fellowship candidate's research plan, how well someone teaches, or how much value people receive from a particular government policy) are not clearly measured on interval scales. Often such variables are measured on the simple 5-, 7-, 9-, or 10-point rating scales that are commonly used in psychology. If such rating measures are taken to be ordinal and trade-offs are allowed, then, applying the analysis given in the preceding sections, one can obtain at best partial orders of such output dimensions as the suitability of different candidates for a fellowship or government policies.
In many of these examples, we have been considering judgment or decision processes that might take place within an individual (or within a group). However, the basic reasoning also applies to psychological measures that are taken across individuals. In summated rating scales, scores for a number of different items are added to make a composite scale measure, a practice that has been common in psychology since Likert, Roslow, and Murphy (1934) . For example, Fletcher, Simpson, Thomas, and Giles (1999) asked participants to rate the importance of different ideals for a partner (e.g., understanding, romantic, sexy, good sense of humor, nice house or apartment) on 7-point scales. Factor analysis of these items then suggested three dimensions of importance for the ideal partner-warmth-trustworthiness, vitality-attractiveness, and status-resources-all formed by summing the appropriate items.
If Fletcher et al.'s (1999) original ideal items are regarded as interval scales, then it seems reasonable to regard the three ideal partner dimensions as being at least ordinally scaled. If, however, the items are regarded only as ordinal scales, then the dimensions will be only partially ordered (see also Michell, 1999) . The issue is of particular importance, as rating scales of the type used for the ideal items are sometimes regarded by researchers as interval (as effectively they are by Fletcher et al.) and sometimes as ordinal.
Having developed ideal partner dimensions such as warmthtrustworthiness, Fletcher et al. (1999) used them to predict mate selection. Thus, the output dimensions from the Fletcher et al. study now become the input dimensions for determining mate preference. Not surprisingly, most people would like a partner who scores highly on all three dimensions, but if they are asked to choose between "warm and homely or cold and beautiful" (Fletcher, Tither, O'Loughlin, Friesen, & Overall, 2004, p. 659) , then they will do so. This is not an isolated example. It is quite common in both psychological theorizing and real-life decision making for the same dimension to be regarded as both an output variable from one process and an input variable to a subsequent process. So, in the fellowship example, evaluation of a research plan is likely to be affected by the quality of writing and organization, as well as the viability of the proposed research. On the other hand, the receipt of a graduate fellowship might itself become an input variable: Whether or not someone has received one might be important in their future career prospects and choices (Chapman & McCauley, 1993) . As a more theoretical example, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale assumes a hierarchy of correlated intelligence factors: Intelligence is conceived to be made up of verbal and performance intelligence, each of which is measured by several subscales, which in turn are based on a number of different items (Kaufman & Lichtenberger, 2002) .
We are now in a position to see that the implications of the earlier analysis restrict the use of ordinal scales over a wide range of psychological applications. Basically, if one or more of the input variables at some level of the process is ordinally scaled, then unambiguous trade-offs become impossible, and only partial ordering of the output variable can be expected. If there are a number of such ordinal-level input variables and these are not strongly positively correlated, then there will be rather little ordering of the output variable. 3 The introduction of an ordinal-level variable at any level of processing entails partial ordering at the next level of evaluation. The output variable at any subsequent level of processing then has to make use of input variables that are themselves only partially ordered, and clearly we could expect very little ordering information to be in this output variable.
Thus, for example, if Fletcher et al.'s (1999) ideal items (understanding, sexy, etc.) are simply measured on ordinal scales, then dimensions such as warmth-trustworthiness are partially ordered, and eventual mate selection makes use of input dimensions that are only partial orders. It is hard to see how consistent results of the kind that are actually obtained from this line of research (e.g., Fletcher et al., 2004; Overall, Fletcher, & Simpson, 2006) could arise from such information. Similarly, in the essay example, if assessment of originality is ordinal, evaluations of essay excellence would then be partially ordered, and final assessments of overall excellence in a course might contain very little consistent order information at all.
Do Any Psychological Processes Use Trade-Offs?
Ordinally scaled input variables do not lead to consistent weakly or totally ordered output variables if the psychological processes trade off the input variables. However, one could ask whether real psychological processes do use trade-offs, particularly as there are theoretical alternatives, which we explore further on.
In a fairly clear-cut example, psychophysical research on the loudness of sound, or the detectability of faint stimuli in audition or vision, has revealed quite orderly trade-off relationships among different variables. For instance, the loudness and detectability of relatively brief tones are quite closely determined by the energy contained in the sound, and the duration and intensity of the sound can be traded off to produce this energy (e.g., Buus, Florentine, & Poulsen, 1997; Garner & Miller, 1947) .
Research on choice behavior with animals has amassed considerable evidence that preference between different rewarding outcomes can be accurately modeled in terms of trade-offs between multiple dimensions (Staddon & Cerutti, 2003) . For example, in a typical experiment hungry pigeons might peck two response keys during a choice phase that are associated with different reward outcomes. One outcome provides a small food reward after a short delay, whereas the other provides a larger reward after a longer delay. A response to the alternative leading to the smaller, more immediate reward is described as an impulsive choice, whereas a response for the larger, more delayed reward is termed self-control (Rachlin, 2000) . Choice in such paradigms can be described by models based on the matching law (Herrnstein, 1961) , which assume that the effects of reward immediacy and amount are additive and independent (Grace, 1994 (Grace, , 1995 . There is also evidence that pigeons can evaluate trade-offs among three reward variables (immediacy, amount, and probability) and show consistent preferences within a single experimental session (Kyonka & Grace, 2008) . Such results suggest that animals are capable of more than ordinal-level representation of reinforcer and other stimulus variables.
These examples use input variables that can be unambiguously characterized as interval scales. However, as we noted earlier, Fletcher et al. (2004) also found evidence for stable and consistent trade-offs using derived psychological dimensions such as warmth-trustworthiness. Overall, then, it seems reasonable to conclude that some actual psychological processes do integrate information from input dimensions using trade-offs. This is not to say, however, that people always perform tradeoffs in the same way. There is a body of research showing that in choice tasks in which participants choose which of two alternatives they would like to receive, more weight is given to the most prominent dimension than it is in matching tasks, in which participants are asked to state the level of a less prominent dimension that would make them indifferent between the two alternatives (e.g., Hsee, 2000; Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999; Slovic, 1975; Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988) . Moreover, the ordering of evaluation scales derived from trading off more than one interval scale dimension is not always stable (Cooke & Mellers, 1998; Mellers & Biagini, 1994; Mellers & Cooke, 1994) . For example, Mellers and Cooke (1994) considered the influence of rent and distance from campus on the attractiveness of apartments for university students and found that the effect of a given attribute distance (e.g., a $50 difference in monthly rent) on judged attractiveness depended on the range of the attributes presented.
Do Psychological Processes Require Trade-Offs?
At least some psychological processes may integrate and trade off information consistently. However, an alternative theoretical framework for decision making essentially rejects the notion of a single evaluation dimension that integrates information from different input variables. Instead, the input variables are considered sequentially, and the result is a lexicographic ordering. For example, a simple rule for choosing candidates for a fellowship might involve setting a cutoff score on the examination score and then considering the suitability of all the candidates who attain this score or greater solely on the basis of their plans for graduate study. In this case, a final choice is made without ever trading off examination scores and plans for the future.
Psychological models of this kind date back at least to H. A. Simon (1956) . Gigerenzer and his colleagues (e.g., Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2006; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Hutchinson & Gigerenzer, 2005) suggested that decision making in both humans and animals might very often proceed according to simple algorithms or heuristics that do not make use of trade-offs. Such decision making is claimed to have the advantages of being fast and frugal (in terms of using cognitive capacity). Moreover, the actual decisions made are frequently close to optimal.
One such reasoning heuristic, "Take the best," is a simple method for answering questions such as which of two German cities is bigger (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Hutchinson & Gigerenzer, 2005) . The rule operates by the sequential examination of such cues as, Which city has a football team in the Bundesliga (first division)? Which city has a university? The cues themselves may be ordered by taking the cue that offers the best predictive power first. If this provides an answer (e.g., Hamburg has a Bundesliga team but Leipzig does not; therefore Hamburg is bigger), then the choice is made. If no solution is found (either both or neither city has such a team), one moves on to the next cue, and so on. In such lexicographic ordering, the input dimensions need only satisfy the requirements of weak ordering. Yet, provided one has enough input dimensions, all the elements can be totally ordered. Thus, in contrast to the situation in which trade-offs are allowed, the consideration of further ordinal-level input dimensions results in more ordering of the output dimension rather than less. Lexicographic ordering is far from the only heuristic method. Simple tallying of the number of dimensions favoring one or the other of the possible choices might also be used (e.g., Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) . Here more than one dimension is considered but not whether, for example, option A might be far ahead on one dimension and only slightly behind on another, and thus there is no trade-off of different scores on the different dimensions.
So far we have considered processes that use or do not use trade-offs as quite distinct. However, the boundary is not always clear-cut. On the theoretical level, it is worth noting that a lexicographic order can easily be made into an additive model. Suppose we have simple input variables x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , all coded as either 0 or 1 (x 1 might be whether a city has a football team, x 2 whether it has a university, etc). We can simply make a new variable y ϭ 100x 1 ϩ 10x 2 ϩ x 3 . Although the model is additive, it does not permit trade-offs, because 10x 2 and x 3 are never large enough to outweigh 100x 1 . On both the theoretical and the practical levels, it is possible to think of examples in which trade-offs are rare but not impossible and in which the values of one variable are usually but not always decisive. So, for example, suppose a psychology department is hiring new faculty and generally weights research productivity much more highly than teaching ability. However, of the two applicants for one position, Smith is perceived to have a clear but small margin in research productivity over Jones, but Jones is enormously better as a teacher and is offered the job. 4 Up until now we have considered alternatives to trade-offs mainly in the context of judgment and decision making, chiefly because much of the relevant research has been in this area. Nonetheless, the issue is relevant for other areas of psychology as 4 Restriction of response range also limits the possibility for trade-offs when interval scales are presumed. So, for example, if a scale is made up of 10 items and each item is scored on a 7-point scale, after we have scored nine items, and A is more than 6 points ahead of B, then no score on the 10th item will put B ahead. But if the responses to the items are treated as orders and we know only that A is ordered ahead of B on the first nine items examined, but not by how much, then we cannot in the additive model exclude the possibility that B might overall score higher. (Simple tallying of the number of items favoring A or B, e.g., Alba & Marmorstein, 1987; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996, might be used instead.) well. As we remarked earlier, psychological measures of individual difference are often constructed as summated rating scales, and individual items contribute additively (and often equally). But other models are also used. Simple tallying of dichotomous responses to items is common in scale construction, and mathematical analysis shows these tallies to relate well to the presumed underlying trait scores (e.g., Grayson, 1988; Ü nlü, 2008) . It is also possible to construct individual difference measures using computerized adaptive testing in which questions are asked sequentially, such that questions after the first vary with the answers given to previous questions (van der Linden & Glas, 2000) . Such methods have the practical advantage of normally needing fewer questions to measure constructs. The methods are clearly similar to "Take the best," although the questions used do not generally produce a true lexicographic order. Even if sequential diagnostic testing is not frequent in psychology, it is commonly used in a variety of other fields. In testing for acute coronary syndrome, for example, a physician will often initially obtain an electrocardiogram and a troponin 1 blood test. The results of these tests are then used to determine whether further, more invasive, and more risky tests are obtained (Braunwald et al., 1994) .
Ordinal Input Variables in Psychological Models
Some of the examples of input variables we have considered are hypothesized to exist within an individual and be used in making real decisions. Many of us would like to think, for example, that when serving on a fellowship selection committee, we can accurately perceive the quality of a research plan and use that information in our decision making. If some of the input variables available to the individual (e.g., perceived quality) are only ordinally scaled and trade-offs are possible, then there is an indeterminacy problem for how the individual orders the output variable.
On the other hand, the variables available to outside observers, such as psychological researchers, may be theoretical constructs that may or may not relate to the variables that the individual respondent uses or has access to. It is important to note that the mathematical reasoning outlined in this article is general and applies just as much to variables measured by external observers as to those that arise within an individual. Thus, when we considered the research into the ideal partner, and variables such as warmth-trustworthiness that were constructed by the researchers, the same scaling considerations applied as when we considered the way in which a fellowship committee member might assess a candidate's research plan.
In practice, the nature of measurement carried out by external observers does not appear to us quite such a critical issue, because the process of obtaining the measures is more open to scrutiny. For example, the intervals in a final individual-difference output measure can be defined in terms of z scores that can be related to the distribution over a presumed normal population; the relationships between input and output variables can be quantified; and the stability of the measures can be examined through reliability statistics.
One psychologically important case remains to be considered. This is the situation in which a judgment or some other process is performed internally with interval scales but the external observer can view the scales (or some of them) only as ordinal measures. The possibility arises because the internal dimension used by the organism and its behavioral consequence (or other external measure) do not need to have the same level of measurement. For example, even if one knows and makes use of the actual metric heights of Anna, Brenda, and Carl, one could simply describe them ordinally: Anna is taller than Brenda, who is taller than Carl. Similarly, the vast literature on preferences and choices usually regards these as constituting an ordinal scale, because if one chooses A rather than B, an external observer can reasonably infer that the individual prefers A to B but not by how much, at least not without making further assumptions. Hence, for example, the frequent assertion in economics that utility is measurable only on an ordinal scale (e.g., Eatwell, Milgate, & Newman, 1987, Volume 4; Knopf, 1991; C. P. Simon & Bloom, 1994) .
Accommodating this case in the general framework developed so far in this article can be done in one of two ways. On the one hand, the researcher could work with the variables actually measured, accept them as ordinal, and develop a theory about how they relate. However, to maintain consistency, such a theory should either feature output variables that are only partially ordered or exclude the possibility of trade-offs between the input variables. In the latter case, there is an obvious risk that the model might exclude trade-offs that actually take place. On the other hand, the researcher could construct the theory as an interconnection of presumed interval-scaled latent variables and then use the observed data as indicator variables only to test specific hypotheses that arise from this theory. This strategy is often used in psychology (e.g., Bollen, 2002; Kline, 2004) . Ideally, such a theory might explain how the ordinal-level data arise from and are related to the presumed underlying interval-scaled dimensions. Moreover, although the strategy may produce consistent results if the underlying scales are interval and the theory is a reasonable description of their relationship, failure to obtain such results will be difficult to interpret.
A distinction is often drawn between causal or formative indicators, which are indicator variables that are presumed to have a direct causal effect on the latent variable, and effect or reflective indicators, which are presumed to arise from the latent variable (Blalock, 1964; Bollen, 2002; Howell, Breivik, & Wilcox, 2007) . For example, time spent watching violent television programs might be a causal indicator of exposure to media violence. On the other hand, the scores on a test of introversion might be taken as effect indicators of the latent variable of introversion (Bollen, 2002) . Seen simply as indicators of the latent variable, much the same consequences apply regardless of whether an ordinally scaled variable is a causal or effect indicator. On the other hand, as we have seen, an ordinal causal indicator cannot, either in a model or in reality, be an input to a stable interval-scaled latent output variable. For the model to make sense, the researcher would have to take the indicator as standing for a causal indicator that is itself latent but antecedent to the latent variable of interest.
The consideration that the input variables to a real or hypothesized psychological process might attain only ordinal scale status confronts the researcher with strategic choices. One possibility is to assume that the input variables are measured on interval scales (or at any rate on scales more structured than ordinal scales) and proceed with the normal trade-off modeling. This is the common present practice. In the following section we argue that the assumption of underlying interval scaling should not be automatically discarded when one is confronted with simple rating scales, and thus that the common practice of using trade-off modeling can generally be retained.
A second possibility is to use a model that does not permit trade-offs. Indeed, the researcher of a decision process might find that the participants report using a decision tree, rather than trading off different attributes. As we have just seen, such models are quite viable and are capable of producing interesting predictions (e.g., H. A. Simon, 1956) .
A third possibility might be to use a model that permits tradeoffs and accept that some combinations of the ordinally scaled input variables might not produce consistently resolvable outcomes. This strategy seems to us less desirable than the other two, and particularly so when the input variables are numerous or negatively correlated. Where it is used, it might be advisable to provide participants with an "I am comparing apples with oranges and cannot decide" response category. Otherwise, by insisting that participants provide a weak or complete rather than a partial ordering, one may obtain inconsistent results.
A number of criteria can be used to decide among these strategic choices. Perhaps the most important, already alluded to in the discussion of Fletcher et al.'s (1999) research, is whether the model produces results that are reasonably consistent, interesting, and useful. A number of tests are available for assessing the consistency of output variables. For example, Fletcher et al. used interrater reliability analyses to assess the consistency of ideal partner dimensions. A similar approach was taken by McCauley (1991) as part of his assessment of the National Science Foundation fellowship award procedure. Decision-making researchers (e.g., Mellers & Biagini, 1994; Mellers & Cooke, 1994) have looked for and sometimes found violations of transitivity (where choice A is preferred to B, and B is preferred to C, but C is preferred to A). Other straightforward tests would establish whether in fact participants do use trade-offs or report using them (e.g., Hilbig, 2008) .
Researchers might also consider examining the nature of input variables directly by considering what happens when nonlinear but order-preserving transformations such as logarithmic or arcsine transformations are applied. By definition such transformations do not affect the nature of ordinal scales but do affect the nature of interval scales. If the character of a variable clearly is changed by such a transformation, the variable cannot be simply ordinal.
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What Does Consistently Ordered Output Tell Us About the Input Variables?
We have seen that if input variables are only ordinally scaled and if trade-offs between these variables take place, then we do not obtain stable, reasonably well-ordered output variables. We can also reason backward. If we do obtain output variables that are stable and ordered, then either there was no trading off between the input variables or the input variables have more structure than is found in a simple total or weak ordering. In this case either the input variables are measured on some scale type intermediate between interval and purely ordinal or they satisfy the requirements for interval measurement. We consider these possibilities in turn.
The question of whether there are any useful scales that have more structure than ordinal scales but not as much as interval scales has received some attention. A major result from measurement theory is that there do not appear to be any such interesting or useful scales with representation in the system of real numbers (Alper, 1987; see also Hand, 1996; Luce & Narens, 1987; Narens, 1981 Narens, , 2002 . However, such scales could be represented in the rational numbers (Cameron, 1989) or finite sets. In practice, human participants often do restrict themselves to a narrow range of responses and rarely use irrational numbers. For example, although respondents on a 7-point rating scale sometimes respond with 2.5, they rarely respond with pi or the square root of 2. Thus, such structures could have psychological existence.
One such intermediate scale is the ordered metric scale (e.g., Coombs, 1964; Krantz et al., 1971, Chapter 9; Siegel, 1956) . Basically, an ordered metric scale is one in which there is an order not only of the elements themselves but also of the distance between the elements. So, for example, if judgments of people's heights constituted an ordered metric scale, we would say not only that Anna is taller than Brenda and Brenda is taller than Carl, but also that the difference in height between, say, Brenda and Carl is greater than the difference in height between Anna and Brenda. It is easy to see that the additional requirement imposes more structure than simple ordering.
Ordered metric scales have not been commonly used in psychology, perhaps because it does not seem easy for participants to produce the measures without working backward from an interval scale. Nor, for example, do we know much about the consequences of using such a scale as an input variable in the additive model for obtaining consistent, ordered output. (Note, however, that the proof given in Appendix B does not apply if the additional constraint is applied.) In general, there has been little attention paid to using or even identifying other possible structures intermediate between ordinal and interval scales. It is possible that in the future some such useful and plausible intermediate scale will emerge, but at present there is little available.
Putting aside the issue of intermediate scales, we turn to the possibility that some psychological input variables-scales or ratings of different kinds, for example-might often be interval scales. This possibility is suggested to some extent by the reasoning outlined earlier in this article. Moreover, there are other reasons for believing that psychological measurement might often attain interval measurement status.
First, in keeping with Stevens (1955) , psychological measures are often thought not to be interval scales because different plausible measures of a psychological construct may not linearly relate to one another. However, it is important to note that this frequently occurs in nonpsychological measurement. So, for example, to measure the construct size of squares, one could use either the actual area of the squares (measured in m 2 perhaps) or the length of a side (measured in m). Both measures are interval (indeed, ratio) scales; both are reasonable measures of the construct, although likely to be used in slightly different circumstances; but the area measure is the square of the side-length measure, not a linear transform of it. Thus, finding that different plausible measures of a construct are nonlinearly related does not imply that the mea-5 For example, assume that a particular category rating scale has been arrived at by respondents applying range-frequency theory (Parducci, 1965) . In this theory the category boundaries are the midpoints of those obtained by considering only the range of values and those obtained by considering the frequency distributions. It is fairly easy to show that simple monotonic transformations can move elements across category boundaries, showing that in this case the underlying scale cannot be simply ordinal. (As a simple example, try 10 equally spaced points [1, 2, . . . 10], five categories, and determine the category boundaries. Then square all the values and redetermine.) sures themselves cannot be interval scales, although it is certainly true that some inferences about the construct made using one measure do not follow if other measures are used (Maxwell & Delaney, 1985) . For example, whether there are interactive effects of two variables on an output variable is affected by nonlinear transformations of the output variable (Smith, 1976) .
Second, the empirical evidence suggests that, depending on the circumstances, ordering or ranking stimuli is not always easy. Respondents often find it faster and easier to produce category ratings of stimuli than to rank-order them (e.g., Alwin & Krosnick, 1985) . In two studies, Kemp, Grace, and Clark (2008) asked respondents to evaluate the relative artistic merit of 20 photographs, presumably a complex task that would require consideration of a number of different dimensions. In the first study, student participants were asked to rank-order the photographs, and many chose to do so after first grading or categorizing the pictures. In the second study, the nature of the final evaluation dimensions was left quite open, and the majority of participants chose simply to mark each out of 10 or 20.
Generally speaking, in competitive sports the margin of victory, which might be taken as an interval measure, is of much less consequence than winning or losing (the ordinal measure). Yet, in many team sports, the order is determined via the establishment of an interval scale. Thus, for example, the outcome of a soccer or a baseball game is determined by a simple count of how many goals or runs are scored. The outcome of a rugby, basketball, or American football game is determined by a count of points, which are obtained by adding weighted scores on different dimensions (e.g., tries or touchdowns and field goals). Again, such observations suggest the possibility that some ordinal measures might be produced after first working with underlying interval scales. (Note, too, that these considerations apply much more seriously to ordered metric scales than to simple ordering.)
Third, both human beings and animals exist in a physical world that is often well described by interval scale measures that permit trade-offs. Many physical laws can be described as principles of conservation in which there are orderly trade-offs between variables measured on interval or ratio scales (Feynman, 1965) . As humans and animals have some capability for predicting states of the world, one should not be surprised to find them using interval scale measures and applying them to conceptualize trade-off relationships (cf. Shepard, 2001) .
These three considerations do not provide decisive evidence that all or even most psychological measures are interval scales. However, they do suggest hesitation before dismissing out of hand the possibility that a particular measure might constitute an interval scale. The reasoning earlier in this article suggests the hesitation should perhaps be longer if we find that the measures serve as input variables whose trading off results in stable, well-ordered output variables.
Conclusion
We begin by summarizing our main argument. The incorporation of an input variable that is measured only on an ordinal scale implies that the output variable of a multiattribute process cannot achieve stable weak ordering, unless that ordering is lexicographic and excludes the possibility of trading off the input variables. Instead of a weak order, we obtain a partial order in which some pairs of elements cannot be stably ordered. The amount of ordering in the partial order increases with the level of positive association between the ordinal-level input variables and decreases with the number of them. Moreover, once ordinal-level variables are introduced into some level of the process, subsequent levels of processing, which use the previous stage's output variables as inputs, would have to make use of input variables that are now only partially ordered. Unless the number of processing stages is small, and the number of dimensions is also small and they are moderately well correlated, little meaningful ordered output could be obtained.
This analysis applies to both the case in which one focuses on the internal judgment or decision-making processes within an organism and the case in which one focuses on linkages between externally measured variables (e.g., the causal models of social psychology). However, it is possible that interval-scaled variables used for an internal judgment process could be measured via ordinal scales. The internal judgments would allow for stable trade-offs, but these could not be modeled with the externally observed ordinal scales.
Our analysis has focused on situations in which ambiguous or partially ordered output variables may arise. However, it is worthwhile to bear in mind that there are also situations in which the conditions for obtaining well-ordered output variables are fulfilled. The input variables may all be measured on interval scales. The input variables may be measured only on ordinal scales, but trade-offs among the input variables do not take place, and, as we have seen, models of such processes are widely available. Finally, the problem we have identified follows from ordinally scaled input variables, not ordinally scaled output variables. Thus, for example, utility in economic analyses is generally regarded as an-often the-output variable and is rarely conceived to be traded off against other variables. Indeed, many important conclusions regarding utility as an output variable can be drawn despite its ordinal scale status (e.g., C. P. Simon & Bloom, 1994) .
There are several implications of our analysis for how psychologists conduct research, some of which have been alluded to already. As noted earlier, psychologists commonly ask research participants to rate statements or items on simple 5-, 7-, or 9-point scales on such dimensions as importance or level of agreement with the item. If these responses are used as inputs to summated rating scales, they are effectively treated as interval scales by researchers. If, on the other hand, they are treated simply as dependent variables in their own right (e.g., Fletcher et al., 1999 , might have been interested in seeing whether women rated the importance of sexiness higher than men), they are sometimes treated as ordinal scales (and Mann-Whitney U tests recommended), sometimes as interval scales. It is hard to justify this different treatment.
In our view, the most important implications have to do with the models that psychologists use to describe the processes and phenomena they research, rather than with the way that the data are analyzed. Luce (1996, p. 91) 
remarked:
It is worth noting that many social scientists believe that it is easier to work with ordinal scales rather than interval ones. . . . It certainly is easier to collect ordinal data than interval. . . . But for theory construction exactly the opposite order of strength is the case. The theory is more constrained, not less, by the "weaker" of two scales.
The present article exemplifies this point. If the input variables to a psychological process or a model of a psychological process that is thought to entail trade-offs are only ordinally scaled, then the output of these processes is not likely to be well ordered. To obtain well-ordered output from ordinally scaled input, it is necessary to constrain the theory and exclude the possibility of tradeoffs. Yet, as we have seen, a wide range of commonly used psychological modeling techniques that allow trade-offs do make use of input variables that are sometimes regarded as ordinal. For example, both multiple regression and principal component analysis are based on a linear model that allows for trade-offs among input variables, and it is common for researchers to use simple rating measures as the input variables. Many multiattribute decision models also use such variables and allow for trade-offs (Edwards, 1977; Mulaik, 2010; Pedhazur, 1982) .
Researchers who have good reason to believe that interval-level measurement has not been attained would be well advised to check that the variables they are dealing with-particularly variables that constitute the output of psychological processes that permit tradeoffs-actually do display stable ordering. Do individual respondents show consistent preferences? Our expectation is that some output variables will not show consistent ordering.
An alternative is to question whether the type of theory is appropriate. It may be that a model that does not permit trade-offs may be more appropriate. On a much more speculative and theoretical point, it is possible that if actual decision makers are presented only with ordinal-level input variables, they might achieve better results by using such rules as "Take the best." It would also be interesting to investigate experimentally whether people change the decision-making strategies they use if they are provided with information that is given as ordinal or interval scaled.
Psychologists following Stevens (1946 Stevens ( , 1955 have often been scolded by critics for simply treating their measures as though they were interval level. Indeed, in the previous section we suggested that sometimes these criticisms may have been unjustified. However, the theoretical consequences of the apparently innocuous assumption that the measures might be only at ordinal level have not always been considered. Yet, as we have seen, these consequences are serious. Considerable evidence exists for stable tradeoffs in at least some circumstances, indicating that some psychological processes employ input variables that are measurable on interval (or at least more than ordinal) scales.
We write, for example, x § (x 1 , . . . , x N ) in the space R N . We say that x is increasing if x 1 Ͻ x 2 . . . Ͻ x N , decreasing if x 1 Ͼ x 2 . . . Ͼ x N , and discrete if x i x j , whenever i j.
Theorem
Let x, y be vectors in R N such that x is increasing, y is decreasing, and x, y, and x ϩ y are discrete. (That is, all x i ϩ y i x j ϩ y j , for i j.) Let m, n be such that m Ͼ n and x n ϩ y n Ͼ x m ϩ y m .
Then there exists a decreasing yЈ in R N such that (a) x m ϩ y m Ј Ͼ x n ϩ y n Ј and (b) for all i m and j m, if x i ϩ y i Ͻ x j ϩ y j , then x i ϩ y i Ј Ͻ x j ϩ y j Ј .
Proof
We write z § x ϩ y. Let ε 1 § min{x iϩ1 Ϫ x i , y i Ϫ y iϩ1 } (1 Յ i Յ N) and 0 Ͻ ε Ͻ 1 N min{ε i : 1 Յ i Յ N}.
(Appendices continue)
Let be the permutation of (1, 2, . . . , N) such that z (1) Ͼ
